Abstract. In this work, we consider the task of allowing a content provider to enforce complex access control policies on oblivious protocols conducted with anonymous users. As our primary application, we show how to construct privacy-preserving databases by combining oblivious transfer with an augmented anonymous credential system. This permits a database operator to restrict which items each user may access, without learning anything about users' identities or item choices. This strong privacy guarantee holds even when users are assigned different access control policies and are allowed to adaptively make many queries. To do so, we show how to augment existing anonymous credential systems so that, in addition to certifying a user's attributes, they also store state about the user's database access history. Our construction supports a wide range of access control policies, including efficient and private realizations of the Brewer-Nash (Chinese Wall) and Bell-LaPadula (Multilevel Security) policies, which are used for financial and defense applications. In addition, our system is based on standard assumptions in the standard model and, after an initial setup phase, each transaction requires only constant time.
Introduction
There is an increasing need to provide privacy to users accessing sensitive information, such as medical or financial data. The mere fact that a rare disease specialist accesses a certain patient's medical record exposes information about the private contents of the record. At the same time, newly developed regulations governing such sensitive data (e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley, HIPAA) require content providers to enact strict accounting procedures. These may seem like conflicting goals since the specialist may wish to hide which patient's record she is requesting while the database operator may wish to ensure that the doctor's collective accesses do not violate regulations. The situation becomes even more precarious when a patient uses such a database to look up information about a potentially sensitive medical condition. In such cases, the patient's identity, as well as her access patterns, must remain hidden from the database administrator. The increasing trend toward outsourcing and distributing sensitive databases, such as the outsourced medical database provided by Google Health [27] , makes these concerns all the more compelling.
Previous works have proposed to construct privacy-friendly databases using Private Information Retrieval [20] or Oblivious Transfer [30, 15] . In a k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol, a content provider with messages M 1 , . . . , M N and a user with indices σ 1 , . . . , σ k ∈ [1, N ] interact in such a way that at the end the user obtains M σ1 , . . . , M σ k without learning anything about the other messages and the provider does not learn anything about σ 1 , . . . , σ k . This tool leads to privacy-friendly databases when the user gets her choice of any files with no restrictions. Unfortunately, that scenario rules out many practical database applications. Worse, the previous work in this area provides no insight as to how access control might ever be incorporated into such a database, since traditional access control mechanisms assume knowledge of the items being requested.
Thus, to realize a practical "oblivious database" for our users, we must couple it with enforceable access controls. We make three design choices that act as guiding principles for our system. Our first is to maintain all anonymity and privacy guarantees provided by the oblivious transfer protocol. We reject any solutions that use pseudonyms or allow for some form of transaction linking, since it is too difficult to infer what compromise to privacy might result. Secondly, we wish to enforce a strong notion of access control where the database operator may limit each access based on the user's identity, item requested, and even a history of the user's previous requests. Finally, we require our solution to be efficient, and thus each transaction should take constant time regardless of a user's access history, or the complexity of the access policy which she must follow.
Contributions. To achieve the goals above, we show how to efficiently couple an adaptive, oblivious transfer protocol with an anonymous credential scheme [18, 11] , to provide non-trivial, real-world access controls for oblivious databases. Specifically, we present an extension to existing anonymous credential systems to support history-dependent access controls by embedding the user's current state into the credential, and dynamically updating that state according to welldefined policies governing the user's actions. These stateful anonymous credentials are built on top of well-known signatures with efficient protocols [29, 11, 12, 4] . Our constructions are secure in the standard model under basic assumptions, such as Strong RSA. Additionally, we introduce a technique for efficiently proving that a committed value lies in a hidden range that is unknown to the verifier, which may be of independent interest.
Our constructions can be used to achieve non-trivial access control policies, including the Brewer-Nash (Chinese Wall) [7] and Bell-LaPadula (Multilevel Security) [2] model, which are used in a number of settings, including financial institutions and classified government systems. We discuss simulation-based security definitions for our stateful anonymous credentials, as well as an anonymous and oblivious database system with access controls.
Related Work. Several previous works sought to limit user actions while maintaining privacy, either directly within an existing protocol or through the use of anonymous credentials. Aiello, Ishai, and Reingold [1] proposed priced oblivious transfer, in which each user is given a declining balance that can be spent on each transfer. However, here user anonymity is not protected, and the protocol is also vulnerable to selective-failure attacks in which a malicious server induces faults to deduce the user's selections [30, 15] . The more general concept of conditional oblivious transfer was proposed by Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky, and Rajagopolan [23] and subsequently strengthened by Blake and Kolesnikov [3] . In conditional oblivious transfer, the sender and receiver maintain private inputs (x and y, respectively) to some publicly known predicate q(·, ·) (e.g., the greater than equal to relation on integers). The items in the oblivious transfer scheme are encrypted such that the receiver can complete the oblivious transfer and recover her data if and only if q(x, y) = 1. In addition, techniques from e-cash and anonymous credentials have been used to place simple limitations on an anonymous user's actions, such as preventing a user from logging in more than once in a given time period [8] , authenticating anonymously at most k times [34] , or preventing a user from exchanging too much money with a single merchant [9] . Rather than providing a specific type of limitation or restricting the limitation to a particular protocol, our proposed system instead provides a general method by which arbitrary access control policies can be added to a wide variety of anonymous and oblivious protocols.
Stateful Credentials: Model and Definitions
The goal of typical anonymous credential systems is to provide users with a way of proving certain attributes about themselves (e.g., age, or height) without revealing their identity. Users conduct this proof by obtaining a credential from an organization, and subsequently "showing" the credential without revealing their identity. In addition to the properties of typical credentials, a stateful anonymous credential system adds the additional notion of credential state, which is embedded as an attribute within the credential. The user may update the state in her credential according to some well-defined policy dictated by the credential provider. In practice, this may limit the user to a finite number of states, or a particular sequential ordering of states. To maintain the user's anonymity, it is important that the update protocol not leak information about the credential's current state beyond what the user chooses to reveal.
At a high level, the stateful anonymous credential system, which is defined by the tuple of algorithms (Setup, ObtainCred, UpdateCred, ProveCred), operates as follows. First, the user and credential provider negotiate the use of a specified policy using the ObtainCred protocol. The negotiated policy determines the way in which the user will be allowed to update her credential. After the protocol completes, the user receives an anonymous credential that embeds her initial state in the policy, in addition to other attributes. Next, the user can prove (in zero-knowledge) that the credential she holds embeds a given state, or attribute, just as she would in other anonymous credential systems by using the ProveCred protocol. This allows the user anonymous access to services, while the entity checking the credential is assured of the user's attributes, as well as her state in the specified policy. These proof can be done in such a way that the verifying entity learns nothing about the user's state or attributes. Finally, when the user wishes to update her credential to reflect a change in her state, she interacts with the credential provider using the UpdateCred protocol, to prove (again, in zeroknowledge) her current state and the existence of a transition in the policy from her current state to her intended next state. As with the ProveCred protocol, the provider learns nothing about the user other than the fact that her state change is allowed by the policy previously negotiated within the ObtainCred protocol.
Policy Model. To represent the policies for our stateful credential system, we use directed graphs, which can be thought of as a state machine that describes the user's behavior over time. We describe the policy graph Π pid as the set of tags of the form (pid, S → T ), where pid is the identity of the policy and S → T represents a directed edge from state S to state T . Thus, the user's credential embeds the identity of the policy pid and the user's current state in the policy graph. When the user updates her credential, she chooses a tag and then proves that the policy id she is following is the same as what is provided in the tag and that the tag encodes an edge from her current state to her desired next state.
These policy graphs can be created in such a way that the users may reach a terminal state, and therefore would be unable to continue updating (and consequently using) their credential. In this case, it may be possible for an adversary to perform traffic analysis to infer the policy that the user is following. To prevent this, we consider the use of null transitions in the graph. The null transitions occur as self-loops on the terminal states of the policy graph, and allow the user to update her credential as often as she wishes to prevent such traffic analysis attacks. However, the updates performed on these credentials only allow the user access to a predefined null resource. The specifics of this null resource are dependent on the anonymous protocol that the credential system is coupled with, and we describe an implementation for them in oblivious databases in Section 5.
While these policy graphs are rather simplistic, they can represent complicated policies. For instance, a policy graph can encode the user's history with respect to accessing certain resources up to the largest cycle in the graph. Moreover, we can extend the policy graph tags to include auxiliary information about the actions that the user is allowed to perform at each state. By doing so, we allow the graph to dynamically control the user's access to various resources according to her behavior and history, as well as her other attributes. In Section 5, we examine how to extend these policy graphs to provide non-trivial, real-world access control policies for oblivious databases, as well as a variety of other anonymous and oblivious application.
Protocol Descriptions and Definitions for Stateful Credentials
A stateful anonymous credential scheme consists of the four protocols: Setup, ObtainCred, UpdateCred, and ProveCred. We will now describe their input/output behavior and intended functionality. For the remainder of the paper, let 1 κ be the security parameter.
The provider P generates parameters params and a keypair (pk P , sk P ) for the credential scheme. For each graph Π to be enforced, P also generates a cryptographic representation Π C and publishes this value via an authenticated channel. Each user U generates a keypair and requests that it be certified by a trusted CA. ObtainCred(U(pk P , sk U , Π C ), P(pk U , sk P , Π C , S)): U identifies herself to P and then receives her credential Cred which binds her to a policy graph Π and starting state S. UpdateCred(U(pk P , sk U , Cred, T ), P(sk P , D)): U and P interact such that Cred is updated from its current state to state T , but only if this transition is permitted by the policy Π. Simultaneously, P should not learn U's identity, attributes, or current state. To prevent replay attacks, P maintains a database D, which it updates as a result of the protocol. ProveCred(U(pk P , sk U , Cred), P(pk P , E)): U proves possession of a credential
Cred in a particular state. To prevent re-use of credentials, P maintains a database E, which it updates as a result of the protocol.
Security Definitions. Security definitions for anonymous credentials have traditionally been game-based. Unfortunately, the existing definitions may be insufficient for the applications considered in this work, as these definitions do not necessarily capture correctness. This can lead to problems when we integrate our credential system with oblivious transfer protocols (see e.g., [30, 15] ).
To capture the security requirements needed for our applications, we instead use a simulation-based definition, in which security of our protocols is analyzed with respect to an "ideal world" instantiation. We do not require security under concurrent executions, but rather restrict our analysis to atomic, sequential execution of each protocol. We do so because our constructions, which employ standard zero-knowledge techniques, require rewinding in their proof of security and thus are not concurrently secure. An advantage of the simulation paradigm is that our definitions will inherently capture correctness (i.e., if parties honestly follow the protocols then they will each receive their expected outputs). Informally, the security of our system is captured by the following two definitions:
Provider Security: A malicious user (or set of colluding users) must not be able to falsely prove possession of a credential without first obtaining that credential, or arriving at it via an admissable sequence of credential updates. For our purposes, we require that the malicious user(s) cannot provide a proof of being in a state if that state is not present in her credential.
User Security: A malicious provider controlling some collection of corrupted users cannot learn any information about a user's identity or her state in the policy graph beyond what is available through auxiliary information from the environment.
Due to space considerations, we defer the formal security definitions for stateful anonymous credentials to full version of this paper [21] . In Section 5.1 and Appendix A, we provide definitions for oblivious databases with access control.
In this section, we recall some basic building blocks, and then introduce a new primitive, hidden range proofs, which may be of independent interest.
Pedersen and Fujisaki-Okamoto Commitments. In the Pedersen commitment scheme [32] , the public parameters are a group G of prime order q, and generators (g 0 , . . . , g m ). In order to commit to the values (v 1 , . . . , v m ) ∈ Z m q , the user picks a random r ∈ Z q and sets
Fujisaki and Okamoto [26] provided a composite order variant.
Signatures with Efficient Protocols. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya (CL) [11] designed a signature scheme with two efficient protocols: (1) a protocol for a user to obtain a signature on the value(s) in a Pedersen (or Fujisaki-Okamoto) commitment [32, 26] without the signer learning anything about the message(s), and (2) a proof of knowledge of a signature. Our constructions may be implemented with the Strong RSA signature scheme [11] (and with minor modifications, using bilinear signatures based on the LRSW assumption [12] ). Both schemes consist of the algorithms (CLKeyGen, CLSign, CLVerify), which we describe below:
On input a security parameter, outputs a keypair (pk , sk ). CLSign(sk , M 1 , . . . , M n ). On input one or more messages and a secret signing key, outputs the signature σ. CLVerify(pk , σ, M 1 , . . . , M n ). On input a signature, message(s) and public verification key, outputs 1 if the signature verifies, 0 otherwise.
We could also use other bilinear signatures with efficient protocols (e.g., [4] ), though we do not make use of these in our construction.
Zero-Knowledge Protocols. We use several standard results for proving statements about discrete logarithms, such as (1) a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm modulo a prime [33] or a composite [26, 24] , (2) a proof of knowledge of equality of representation modulo two (possibly different) prime [19] or composite [14] moduli, (3) a proof that a commitment opens to the product of two other committed values [13, 16, 6] , and (4) a proof of the disjunction or conjunction of any two of the previous [22] . These composite-based protocols are secure under Strong RSA and the prime-based ones under the discrete logarithm assumption.
Note that there are several building blocks that are not used in our basic scheme, but which can be used to provide extended functionality or improved performance. These building blocks include:
Bilinear Groups. Let BMsetup be an algorithm that, on input 1 κ , outputs the parameters for a bilinear mapping as γ = (p, G, G T , e, g ∈ G), where g generates G, the groups G, G T each have prime order p, and e : G × G → G T .
Hidden-Range Proofs. Standard techniques [17, 13, 13, 5] allow us to efficiently prove that a committed value lies in a public integer interval (i.e., where the interval is known to both the prover and verifier). In our protocols, it is useful to hide this interval from the verifier, and instead have the prover show that a committed value lies between the openings of two other commitments.
Fortunately
Stateful Anonymous Credentials
In this section, we describe how to realize stateful credentials. The state records information about the user's attributes as well as her prior access history. We will consider two separate modes for "showing" a credential. In the first mode, the user exposes her portions of her state during the ProveCred protocol. This is useful for, say, a DRM application where the user's goal is to prove that her software is in a "licensed" state without revealing her name. In mode two, the user uses her credential to gain access to resources without revealing her state through the use of zero knowledge proofs. Specifically, we show how to tie this credential system to protocols, such as adaptive oblivious transfer, where the user wants to hide both her identity and the item she is requesting while simultaneously proving that she has the credentials to obtain the item.
Basic Construction
Our construction begins with the anonymous credentials of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [29, 11, 12] , where the state is embedded as a field in the signature. The core innovation here is a protocol for performing state updates, and a technique for "translating" a history-dependent update policy into a cryptographic representation that can be used as an input to this protocol.
The setup, credential granting, and credential update protocols are presented in Figure 1 . We will now briefly describe the intuition behind them.
The provider P generates parameters for the CL signature, as well as for the Pedersen commitment scheme.
Party P runs CLKeyGen twice, to create the CL signature keypairs (spk P , ssk P ) and (gpk P , gsk P ). It retains (pk P , sk P ) = ((spk P , gpk P ), (ssk P , gsk P )) as its keypair. The provider's public key pk P must be certified by a trusted CA.
Each party U selects u $ ← Zq and computes the keypair (pk U , sk U ) = (g u , u). The user's public key pk U must be certified by a trusted CA.
Next, for each policy graph Π, P generates a cryptographic representation ΠC.
1. P parses Π to obtain a unique policy identifier pid. 2. For each tag t = (pid, S, T ) in Π, P computes a signature σS→T ← CLSign(gsk P , (pid, S, T )). 3. P sets ΠC ← Π, ∀t : σS→T and publishes this value via an authenticated channel.
ObtainCred(U(pk P , sk U , ΠC), P(pk U , sk P , ΠC, S)): On input a graph Π and initial state S, U first obtains ΠC. U and P then conduct the following protocol:
1. U picks random usage and update nonces Ns, Nu ∈ Zq and computes A ← Commit(sk U , Ns, Nu). 2. U conducts an interactive proof to convince P that A correlates to pk U . 3. U and P run the CL signing protocol on committed values so that U obtains the state signature σstate ← CLSign(ssk P , (sk U , Ns, Nu, pid, S)) with pid, S contributed by P. 4. U stores the credential Cred = (ΠC, S, σstate, Ns, Nu).
UpdateCred(U(pk P , sk U , Cred, T ), P(sk P , D)): Given a credential Cred currently in state S, U and P interact to update the credential to state T :
1. U parses Cred = (ΠC, S, σstate, Ns, Nu) and identifies a signature σS→T in ΠC that corresponds to a transition from state S to T (if none exists, U aborts).
2. U selects N s , N u $ ← Zq and computes A ← Commit(sk U , N s , N u , pid, T ). 3. U sends (Nu, A) to P. P looks in the database D for a pair (Nu, A = A). If no such pair is found, then P adds (Nu, A) to D. Otherwise P aborts. 4. U proves to P knowledge of values (sk U , pid, S, T, N s , N u , Ns, σstate, σS→T ) such that:
(c) CLVerify(gpk P , σS→T , (pid, S, T )) = 1 5. If these proofs do not verify, P aborts. Otherwise U and P run the CL signing protocol on committed values to provide U with σ state ← CLSign(ssk P , A). 6. U stores the updated credential Cred = (ΠC, T, σ state , N s , N u ). Setup. First, the credential provider P generates its keypair and identifies one or more access policies it wishes to enforce. Each policy -encoded as a graphmay be applied to one or more users. The provider next "translates" the graph into a cryptographic representation which consists of the graph description, and a separate CL signature for each tag in the graph. Recall from Section 2 that the tags embed the graph id, start, and end states. The cryptographic policy representations are distributed to users via an authenticated broadcast channel (e.g., by signing and publishing them on a website). The user U generates a keypair that is certified by the CA.
Obtaining a Credential. When a user U wishes to obtain a credential, she first negotiates with the provider to select an update policy to which the credential will be bound, as well the credential's initial state within the policy graph. The user next engages in a protocol to blindly extract a CL signature under the provider's secret key, which binds the user's public key, her initial state, the policy id, and two random nonces chosen by the user. The update nonce N u is revealed when the user updates the credential and the usage nonce N s is revealed when the user show's her credential. This signature, as well as the nonce and state information, form the credential. While the protocol for obtaining a credential, as currently described, reveals the user's identity through the use of her public key, we can readily apply the techniques found in [10, 11] to provide a randomized pseudonym rather than the public key.
Updating the Credential's State. When the user wishes to update a credential, she first identifies a valid tag within the credential's associated policy. She then generates a new pair of nonces and a commitment embedding these values, as well as the new state from her chosen tag. Next, the user sends the update nonce from her current credential, along with the commitment, to the provider. The provider records this nonce and the commitment into a database -however, if the nonce is already in the database but associated with a different commitment, the provider aborts the protocol, which prevents the user from re-using an old version of a credential. By recording the nonce and commitment together, we allow the user to restart the protocol if it has failed as long as she uses the same commitment. If the nonce and commitment are not in the database, the user and provider then interact to conduct a zero-knowledge proof that: (1) the remainder of the information in the commitment is identical to the current credential, (2) the user has knowledge of the secret key corresponding to her current credential, and (3) the policy graph contains a signature on a tag from the current state to the new state. If these conditions are met, the user obtains a new credential embedding the new state.
Showing (or Privately Proving Possession of ) a Credential. The approach to using a single-show credential, shown in Figure 2 , follows [11, 12] . When a user wishes to prove possession of a credential to P, she first reveals the credential usage nonce and the current state of the credential. P must check that the usage nonce has not been used before. The user then proves knowledge of: (1) a CL signature embedding this state value and nonce formed under P's public key, and (2) a secret key that is consistent with the CL signature. Alternatively, if the user does not want to reveal her state explicitly, the user may generate a commitment to her state and prove (in zero knowledge) that it is the same as that which is found in her credential.
Single-show vs. multi-show. This is an example of a single-show credential. It can be shown only once, or the verifier will recognize the repeated usage nonce. To restore its anonymity, the user may return to P and execute the update protocol to replace the usage nonce, assuming it is allowed by the user's policy. This update policy gives users a way to use a single credential multiple times. One can also adapt this scheme to support k-times anonymous use of the credential by using the Dodis-Yampolskiy [25] pseudorandom function to generate the nonces from a common seed, as shown in [8] .
A Note on Efficiency. The efficiency of our protocols is of utmost importance in ensuring their practical use in oblivious databases. During the Setup protocol, the provider must "translate" each of the graphs into a cryptographic representation by signing each tag associated with the graphs. This means that the complexity of the Setup protocol is linear in the size of the policy graphs used in controlling access to the database. While this may seem onerous at first, it is important to emphasize that this process may be conducted offline, and only as a one time cost to the provider. Once the setup procedure is completed, the complexity of the remaining protocols is constant and independent of the size of the policy in use since they deal with only a single tag at a time. Thus, our scheme is practical even for extremely complex policies containing thousands of distinct states and transition rules.
ProveCred(U(pk P , sk U , Cred), P(pk P , E)): User U proves knowledge of the Cred as follows:
1. U parses Cred as (ΠC, S, σstate, Ns, Nu), and sends its usage nonce Ns to P (who aborts if Ns ∈ E). 2. Otherwise, U continues with either:
-(mode one) Sending her current credential state S to P in the clear.
-(mode two) Sending a commitment to S. 3. U then conducts an interactive proof to convince P that it possesses a CL signature σstate embedding Ns, S, and that it has knowledge of the secret key sk U . 4. P adds Ns to E. Theorem 1. When instantiated with the RSA (resp., bilinear) variant of CL signatures, the anonymous credential scheme above achieves user, and provider security under the strong RSA (resp., LRSW) assumption.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in the full version of this work [21] .
In this section, we show how stateful anonymous credentials can be used to control access to oblivious databases. Recall that an oblivious database permits users to request data items without revealing their item choices or their identities to the database operator (e.g., where the item choices are sensitive).
Although we possess efficient building blocks such as k-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer (OT), little progress has been made towards the deployment of practical oblivious databases. In part, this is due to a fundamental tension with the requirements of a database operator to provide some form of access control. In this section, we show that it is possible to embed flexible, history-dependent access controls into an oblivious database without compromising the user's privacy. Specifically, we show how to combine our stateful anonymous credential system with an adaptive Oblivious Transfer protocol to construct a multi-user oblivious database that supports complex access control policies. We show how to efficiently couple stateful credentials with the recent standard-model adaptive OT scheme due to Camenisch, Neven and shelat [15] . Our stateful credentials can also be efficiently coupled with the adaptive OT of Green and Hohenberger [28] . Linking Policies to Database Items. To support oblivious database access, we extend our policy graphs to incorporate tags of the form (pid, S → T, i), where pid is the policy, S → T is the edge, and i is the message index in the database that is allowed by that tag. Each edge in the graph may be associated with one or more tags, which correspond to the items that can be obtained from the database when traversing that edge. As described in Section 2, we place null transitions on each terminal state that allow the user to update her credential and access a predefined null message. The set of all tags, both legitimate and null, are signed by the database and published. Figure 3 shows an example policy for a small database. The interested reader can view a fuller discussion of the non-trivial access control policies, including Bell-Lapadula and Brewer-Nash that are allowed by our credential system in the full version of this work [21] .
Protocol Descriptions and Security Definitions for Oblivious Databases
Our oblivious database protocols combine the scheme of Section 4.1 with a multireceiver OT protocol. Each transaction is conducted between one of a collection of users and a single database server D. We describe the protocol specifications.
The database server D generates parameters params for the scheme. As in the basic credential scheme, it generates a cryptographic representation Π C for each policy graph, and publishes those values via an authenticated channel. In addition, D initializes its database of messages according to the OT protocol in use. Each user U generates a keypair and requests that it be certified by a trusted CA.
U registers with the system and receives a credential Cred which binds her to a policy graph Π id and starting state S. OTAccessAndUpdate(U(pk D , sk U , Cred, t), D(sk D , E)): U requests an item at index i in the database from state S by selecting a tag t = (pid, S → T, i) from the policy graph. The user then updates her credential Cred, in such a way that D does not learn her identity, her attributes, or her current state. Simultaneously, U obtains a message from the database at index i. At the end of a successful protocol, U updates the state information in Cred, and D updates a local datastore E.
Security. We informally describe the security properties of an oblivious database system, with a formal definition given in Appendix A.
Database Security: No (possibly colluding) subset of corrupted users can obtain any collection of items that is not specifically permitted by the users' policies.
User Security: A malicious database controlling some collection of corrupted users cannot learn any information about a user's identity or her state in the policy graph, beyond what is available through auxiliary information from the environment.
The Construction
In our model, many users share access to a single database server. To construct our protocols, we extend the basic credential scheme of Section 4.1 by linking it to the adaptive OT protocol of Camenisch et al. [15] . The database operator commits to a collection of N messages, along with a special null message at index N + 1. It them distributes these commitments (e.g., via a website). Each user then registers with the database using the OTObtainCred protocol, and agrees to be bound by a policy that will control her ability to access the database. To obtain items from the database, the user runs the OTAccessAndUpdate protocol, which proves (in zero knowledge) that its request is consistent with its policy. Provided the user does not violate her policy, the user is assured that the database operator learns nothing about its identity, or the nature of its request. Figures 4 and 5 describe the protocols in detail.
OTAccessAndUpdate(U(pk D , sk U , Cred, t), D(pk D , E)): When U wishes to obtain the message indexed by i ∈ [1, N + 1], it first identifies a tag t in Π such that t = (pid, S → T, i).
1. U parses Cred = (ΠC, S, σstate, Ns), and parses ΠC to find σS→T,i. . U stores the updated credential Cred = (ΠC, T, σ state , N s ). 6. Finally, D returns U = e(V, h) and interactively proves that U is correctly formed (see [15] ). U computes the message Mi = Bi/U 1/v . 
Extensions to Compact Access Policies in Practice
Extension #1: Equivalence Classes. Thus far, the protocol requires that a tag in the policy graph must be defined on every item index in the database. Yet, there are cases where many items may have the same access rules applied, and therefore we can reduce the number tags used by referring to the entire group with a single tag. A simple solution is to replace specific item indices with general equivalence classes in the graph tags. The OT database can be reorganized to support this concept by renumbering the item indices (previously [1, N ] ) using values of the form (c||i) ∈ Z q , where c is the identity of the item class, and || represents concatenation. During the OTAccessAndUpdate protocol, U can obtain any item (c||i) by performing a zero-knowledge proof on the first half of the selection index, showing that the selected tag contains the class c.
Extension #2: Encoding Contiguous Ranges. An alternative approach requires the database operator to arrange the identities of objects in the same class so that they fall in contiguous ranges. In this case, we will label the graph edges with ranges of items rather than single values. The credentials will also replace the value i with an upper and lower bound for the range that the holder of the credential is permitted to access. We make a slight change to the OTAccessAndUpdate protocol so that rather than proving equality between the requested object and the object present in the tag, the user now proves that the requested object lies in the range described in the user selected tag, as described by the hidden range proof technique in Section 3. Notice that while this approach requires that the database be reorganized such that classes of items remain in contiguous index ranges, it can be used to represent more advanced data structures, such as hierarchical classes.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a flexible and efficient system that allows content providers to control access to their data, while simultaneously maintaining the privacy provided by the oblivious and anonymous protocols. Specifically, we described techniques for augmenting traditional anonymous credentials with state, and showed how to combine these credentials with Oblivious Transfer to permit oblivious access to a database enforcing a variety of non-trivial access control policies. The flexibility of our approach makes it relatively straightforward to apply to a diverse set of anonymous and oblivious protocols. For example, our stateful anonymous credentials can be used to control which messages are signed with several blind signature schemes, including those of Waters [35] , Boneh and Boyen [4] , and Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [11, 12] , without ever revealing the message to the signer. Other interesting applications include augmenting oblivious versions of Identity-Based key extraction [28] and keyword search protocols [31] with strong access controls.
